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Abstract
Turkey has been suﬀering from separatist terrorism and the political conﬂict it implies since the
mid-1980s, both of which are believed to have a negative impact on economic welfare. This article
investigates the economic costs of PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) terrorism, particularly in the Eastern
and Southeastern provinces of Turkey by invoking the synthetic control method. We create a synthetic
control group that mimics the socioeconomic characteristics of the provinces exposed to terrorism before
the PKK terrorism emerged in the mid-1980s. We then compare the real GDP of the synthetic provinces
without terrorism to the actual provinces with terrorism for the period 1975-2001. Causal inference is
carried out by comparing the real per capita GDP gap between the synthetic and actual provinces and the
intensity of terrorist activity as measured by the number of terrorism casualties. We ﬁnd that after the
emergence of terrorism, the per capita real GDP in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia declined by about
6.6 percent relative to a comparable synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia without terrorism.
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1 Introduction
Terrorism has four major economic repercussions all of which have the ability to reduce economic welfare:
Terrorist attacks reduce the human and physical capital stock; introduce higher levels of uncertainty; increase
military expenditures and shift resources from productive sectors to defence industry; and adversely aﬀect
speciﬁc industries such as airline or tourism (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). Although these eﬀects may
be pronounced for any type of terrorist activity, may it be domestic, transnational, separatist or radical
Islamist, the nature and roots of an armed conﬂict is crucial in understanding the direction of causality
between terrorism and economic indicators and consequently in designing eﬀective policies in order to combat
terrorism.
In this article, we investigate the economic costs of a highly chronic and invasive political and armed
conﬂict of the modern history of Turkey, namely PKK terrorism, particularly prevalent in Eastern and
Southeastern provinces of Turkey. By invoking the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and expanded by Abadie et al. (2010), we create a synthetic control group that mimics
the socioeconomic characteristics of the provinces exposed to terrorism before the PKK terrorism emerged in
the early 1980s by using the convex combination of provinces that have not been exposed to terrorism. We
then compare the real per capita GDP of the synthetic provinces without terrorism to the actual provinces
with terrorism for the period 1975-2001. Causal inference is carried out by comparing the real per capita
GDP gap between the synthetic and actual provinces and the intensity of terrorist activity as measured by
the number of terrorism casualties. We ﬁnd that after the emergence of terrorism, the real per capita GDP
in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia declined by 6.6 percent relative to a comparable synthetic Eastern and
Southeastern Anatolia without terrorism.
This study contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the causal eﬀect of separatist terrorism
on economic development using a novel methodology which is based on estimating the counterfactual: how
the provincial GDP would have evolved in the absence of terrorism. In doing so, we aim to relax a set of
stringent assumptions made in the literature on the causes and consequences of terrorism and to circumvent
typically encountered problems of heterogeneity, endogeneity and extrapolation biases in traditional regres-
sion framework. Instead of employing a cross-country analysis using aggregate measures of terrorism (e.g.
domestic vs. international or separatist vs. radical Islamist), we focus on a particular case of separatist
terrorism, the PKK terrorism, which allows us to minimize heterogeneity biases. We also circumvent extrap-
olation biases that prevail in traditional regression analysis by restricting the analysis to the support of our
data.
To the best of our knowledge, synthetic control method has not been used so far in studies on PKK
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terrorism. In fact, the limited number of prior inﬂuential studies on the subject fell short in unraveling the
true causal eﬀect of separatist terrorism on economic growth. The application of synthetic control on diﬀerent
types of political conﬂicts, as advocated by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), may strengthen or weaken the
robustness of the procedure and serve as cross validation.
The nature of PKK terrorism we investigate is structurally diﬀerent than the nature of other terrorist
groups such as ETA. ETA terrorism outbreaks in the highly prosperous region of Basque country in Spain and
thus temporal variation in economic prosperity, as argued by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), is unlikely to
have had a sizeable impact on ETA terrorism. In contrast, the PKK terrorism almost exclusively outbreaks in
the least developed regions of Turkey. While in the ETA case, the absence of an endogenous relation between
economic prosperity and the intensity of terrorist activity may be defended on legitimate grounds, in the
PKK case adverse economic conditions may increase the intensity of terrorist activity and raise concerns for
endogeneity.
If the conditions are satisﬁed, the endogenous relation between terrrorism and economic development is
accounted for by the synthetic control method as opposed to instrumental variable (IV) or vector autore-
gression (VAR) methodology repeatedly employed in the empirical literature. While the IV is problematic
because the instruments generally turn out to be weak, invalidating the consistency of the parameter of
interest, the causal implication of VAR methodology is a mere prediction. The synthetic control method not
only bypasses these issues, it also narrows the scope of the analysis by focusing on individual units.
Section 2 gives a brief account of regional disparities and PKK terrorism in Turkey, section 3 discusses the
synthetic control method and its advantages over the traditional panel regression analysis, sections 3.3 and
3.4 respectively present the results and the placebo studies, section 3.5 performs a robustness check, section
4 discusses the ﬁndings of the analysis and the entailed methodological issues, section 5 concludes.
2 Terrorism and Regional Economic Development
2.1 Regional Disparities
Regional inequality is one of the major struggles of the Turkish economy. Tekeli (1992) relates this ongoing
heterogeneity with the historical roots of the Turkish economy and underlines the social and economic de-
terminants of regional imbalances. Tekeli (1992) gives two speciﬁc reasons regarding the continuity of the
dual structure of the Turkish economy: one is the insuﬃciency of Turkey to integrate with Aleppo and its
surrounding in the south; with Caucasus and Russia in the north. The other is the post-war era that results
in a sudden sharp fall in the productive and young labor force during the early ages of the Republic and the
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loss in the young and productive labor force especially in the eastern geography of Turkey, resulting from the
ongoing terrorist activities over the last four decades.
The vast literature in Turkey originates from this duality and discusses whether the post-1980 liberaliza-
tion era witnesses a rise or a fall in regional inequalities. The central hypothesis evolves from the traditional
neoclassical convergence model of Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992); poor regions exhibit higher income growth
rate relative to an already developed or high income region1. While studies indicate that there is little evi-
dence for the poor locations to be growing faster with respect to the rich locations, the majority agree that
this convergence struggle is far from decreasing the wide gap between western and eastern Turkey. These re-
marks are supported by other contemporary inﬂuential studies that focus on the additional spatial dimension
of the regional imbalances in Turkey, signaling the increasing regional heterogeneity in the form of lagging
east and leading west2. Even though it is diﬃcult to fully capture the reasons behind the regional diﬀerences
in the Turkish economy, what we can apprehend is the agglomeration of high economic activity with a better
social and economic environment in the west, and clustering of relatively low level of economic activity with
a social and economic environment well below the Turkish (as well as the European) average in the east and
southeast.
Figure 1 maps the dispersion of provincial income for the 67 NUTS 3 (Nomenclature of Territorial Units
for Statistics-3) regions of Turkey for the 1975-2001 period3. The spatial dispersion of per capita income
during the last decades indicates a persistence of regional imbalances in Turkey; with the western regions in
general well above the average per capita income of the country. Provinces in the Marmara Region, coastal
provinces of the Aegean and the Mediterranean Regions as well as the provinces spread around the capital city
Ankara in the Central Anatolia are located in the highest income quartile of the distribution. On the contrary,
provinces in the Eastern and especially Southeastern Anatolia mostly cluster on the lowest income quartile of
the distribution. Note that the middle income quartile provinces are mostly located on the Central Anatolia
and behave as the transition provinces between high and low income clusters geographically. In general this
dual pattern indicates that there are some positive economies generating externality-based development in
the western territory on one hand and there are some other negative economies that are destroying the social
and economic environment in the east. We claim that, keeping in mind various factors that might aﬀect this
pattern, the role of separatist terrorism can be a vital element behind the failure of these provinces especially
in the eastern and southeastern Turkey to catch more developed locations of the west. The objective of the
1See Doğruel and Doğruel (2003), Karaca (2004), Gezici and Hewings (2004), Yıldırım and Öcal (2006), Gezici and Hewings
(2007) and Öcal and Yıldırım (2010).
2See Kılıçaslan and Özatağan (2007), Filiztekin (2009), Filiztekin and Çelik (2010) and Çelebioğlu and Dall’erba (2010) for
further dimensions of regional inequalities and the role of spatial dependence.
3From 1970s to 2000s, the number of provinces increased from 67 to 81. For our comparison of the 1975 and 2001 income
dispersion, we aggregated these 14 provinces with the regions they were originally part of.
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paper is not to focus on the factors causing this dual structure; rather we question the speciﬁc role of terrorist
activities that may aﬀect these locations negatively. Before getting into the details of our research, below,
we brieﬂy overview the history of separatist terrorism in Turkey and discuss the causal linkages between
terrorism and economic development.
2.2 A Brief History of PKK terrorism in Turkey
Although the organizational history of Kurdish separatism dates back to 1974, it was formally established as a
Marxist/Radical Kurdish Nationalist group in 27 October 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan and named PKK (Partiya
Karkerên Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The organization aimed at establishing an independent
Kurdish state in the region comprising Southeastern Turkey, Northern Iraq and Northeastern Syria. PKK
insurgencies were concentrated mainly in the Kurdish-populated Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey.
In the pre-1980 period, PKK imposed itself through few terrorist acts in Southeastern Turkey. Abdullah
Öcalan escaped Syria shortly before the military coup of 12 September 1980, which brought PKK terrorist
activities to a complete halt until the civilian regime resumed in 1983. PKK took advantage of the political
repression between 1980-1983, recruited new militants and expanded its network (Sayarı, 2010). By 1984,
PKK resumed its ﬁrst terrorist activities in the Eastern provinces of Hakkari and Siirt. It is reported that
between 1984 and 2008, 32,000 militants, about 6,500 security force members and about 5,700 civilians were
killed in PKK terrorist activities4.
Figure 2 shows the monthly intensity of PKK terrorist activity since 1984, measured by the number of
casualties. Province-by-province PKK terrorist activity is collected from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) and extracted from the Wikipedia - PKK attacks and armed conﬂicts chronology5. The information
given in these sources have been cross-checked by a number of news media sources and by the publicly
available information from the Turkish General Staﬀ to verify the details of its content.
On October 1989, Turgut Özal became the ﬁrst president of non-military origin of the Republic after the
1980 military coup. His presidency witnessed a period in which the Kurdish-Turkish political conﬂict was
on the verge of a reconciliation. In search for a resolution, president Özal stated that he would be willing
4Figures are given by Ilker Başbuğ, former Chief of General Staﬀ. See Radikal Gazetesi, 16 September 2008
5Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
PKK attacks and armed conﬂicts chronology: http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKK_saldırıları_ve_çatışmaları_kronolojisi.
Other sources from which data on PKK terrorism could be collected are the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
(MIPT) and the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). While provincial ﬁgures on the number of deaths, attacks and injured are available
from the MIPT, MIPT only includes information on separatist terrorist incidents only after 1998 and the GTI measures the
impact of terrorism at the country level since 2001 whereas our sample covers 1975-2001. Since our methodology does not
involve a regression analysis and does not explicity use the severity or intensity of terrorist activity in constructing the synthetic
controls, collecting data from a source other than the GTD would not make any diﬀerence in our analysis. A downside of the
GTD is that the terrorist incidents are not accompanied by a summary. Therefore, an incident is labelled as separatist only if
PKK claimed responsibility. However, there may be other separatist incidents in Turkey by the PKK but were not claimed by
PKK. In those cases, we did not collect the casualties of those indicidents.
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to allow broadcasting in Kurdish language and open to discuss a federal system. In response to his eﬀorts,
PKK declared the ﬁrst unilateral cease-ﬁre in March 1993. However, the sudden death of Turgut Özal in
April 1993 has called oﬀ the reconciliation process. In May 1993, the National Security Council announced
that PKK members who have not been involved in terrorist acts be pardoned if they surrender. During the
same month, PKK announced the end of ﬁrst unilateral cease-ﬁre, resulting in 17 deaths.
Between March 1993 and August 2010, PKK declared a total of seven cease-ﬁres of which the longest
lasted 4 years and 9 months (Sept. 1999 - Jun. 2004) and the shortest lasted only 2 months (Dec. 1995
- Jan 1996). Terrorist activities were particularly intense during the 1992-1994 period. The average yearly
number of recorded fatalities during this 3-year period was over 1,000. While the number of fatalities were
substantially higher than the number of injuries in the pre-1994 period, this pattern has reversed in the
post-1994 period with improvements in military tactics and technology.
On February 1999, Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya. On September 1999, a group of PKK
members surrendered after Abdullah Öcalan ordered PKK members to leave Turkey. Subsequently, PKK
declared the fourth cease-ﬁre which lasted until June 2004. During this ﬁve year period, PKK stated to have
undergone a structural change in its operational tactics and declared a formal end to its terrorist activities.
On April 2002, PKK changed its name to KADEK (Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê/Kurdistan
Freedom and Democracy Congress) in an attempt to operate as a legal and legitimate organization and stated
that they would purely remain a political organization (Sözen, 2006). On October 2003, KADEK declared
its dissolution and formed KONGRA-GEL (Kongreye Gelê Kurdistan/Kurdistan People’s Congress) in order
to avoid being listed as a terrorist organization by the US and the Europe (Sözen, 2006). Even though
KONGRA-GEL (formerly PKK) declared to adhere to use peaceful methods in achieving its goals, the
organization continued to carry out terrorist activities, citing the government’s refusal to negotiate as a
justiﬁcation for their actions.
2.3 On the Causal Link between Political Freedom, Terrorism and Economic
Development
It may be plausible to infer that the causal relationship between terrorism and economic development is
bidirectional. While terrorism may have severe human and economic consequences due to destruction of
physical capital, lost lives, higher levels of uncertainty which may crowd-out foreign direct investment (FDI)
and an increased share of resources moving away from productive industries, macroeconomic factors may also
aﬀect terrorism. There are few interconnected channels through which macroeconomic conditions may aﬀect
terrorism. First, terrorism may be rooted in economic deprivation, characterized by poverty and inequality.
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Poor economic conditions may foster frustration and despair which may in turn increase the likelihood
of violence (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011; Freytag et al., 2011). Recent evidence further indicates that
economic downturns may also lead to an increasing intensity in terrorist activity or terrorist risk (Blomberg
et al., 2004a,b; DiRienzo and Das, 2012). The link than runs from economic deprivation to terrorism is more
likely to prevail in the case of PKK terrorism which almost exclusively strikes the poorest and the most
underdeveloped regions of the country.
Economic deprivation is closely linked to low educational attainment which may feed terrorism. Unlike
other terrorist organizations such as the Islamic militant group Hezbollah, PKK often recruit their militants
among socio-economically deprived members of the society. This suggests that economic conditions aﬀect
terrorist activity directly through the grievances associated with faltering economic conditions and injustices
and also indirectly through exploiting the conditions that impede modernization eﬀorts. However, these
two eﬀects may not be easily decoupled from one another empirically (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). Poor
economic conditions suppress modernization which in turn foster terrorism. Increasing terrorist activity or
intensity in turn inhibits economic development and modernization.
Identifying the causal relationship between terrorism and economic development has been at the center
of the empirical literature6. The majority of studies have found evidence supporting the view that terrorism
negatively aﬀects national income, although the range of the magnitude of this impact varies considerably.
In within-country studies of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) and Buesa et al.
(2007), separatist terrorism is found to have a sizeable impact on GDP. In cross-country studies of Gupta
et al. (2004) and Blomberg et al. (2004a), domestic and transnational terrorism is found to exert some impact
on GDP growth while Tavares (2004), Abadie (2005) and recently Gries et al. (2011) found no impact of
domestic and/or transnational terrorism on GDP or GDP growth. In other studies, transnational terrorism
is shown to impose signiﬁcant and sizeable eﬀects on the microeconomic climate7.
To the best of our knowledge there has been ﬁve empirical papers dealing with both the roots and the
consequences of terrorism in Turkey exclusively and the evidence is mixed. While Araz-Takay et al. (2009)
and Derin-Güre (2011) account for a potential endogenous relation between GDP (as a proxy for economic
prosperity) and terrorism using the vector autoregression (VAR) methodology, the former study ﬁnds a causal
link that runs from GDP to terrorism only in recessionary periods but the latter study ﬁnds no causal link
irrespective of the course of the overall economy. A potential explanation of this inconsistency, inter alia,
given the methodological similarities is that the former study accounts for both domestic and transnational
6See Sandler and Enders (2008) and Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) for an excellent overview of the literature on the roots
and consequences of terrorism.
7See Enders and Sandler (1996) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) on the impact of terrorism on net FDI; Drakos and
Kutan (2003), Enders and Sandler (1991) and Enders et al. (1992) on tourism; Chen and Siems (2004) and Eldor and Melnick
(2004) on ﬁnancial markets; and Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) on bilateral trade.
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terrorism while the latter study only takes into account incidences of separatist terrorism.
Employing the geographically weighted regression (GWR) methodology to obtain local parameter esti-
mates, Öcal and Yıldırım (2010) analyzes the economic consequences of separatist terrorism and states that
terrorism hinders economic growth. In a subsequent article using the same methodology, Yıldırım and Öcal
(2012) concludes that policies aimed at enhancing income, education and employment would inhibit terror-
ism. An earlier study by Feridun and Sezgin (2008) also suggests that GDP, in particular agriculture and
government services, may be helpful in explaning separatist terrorism. While Öcal and Yıldırım (2010) seems
to be the closest to ours in terms of the focus of interest, the approach followed in our study explicitly deals
with endogeneity caused by the presence of time-varying unobservable provincial heterogeneity which has not
been taken into account by the above studies in a causal framework8.
A close inspection reveals that the inconsistency of the results in the literature may be attributed to (1)
weak theoretical guidance on the nature and impact of terrorism, (2) failure to account for the correct type
of terrorism (i.e. domestic, international, separatist, radical Islamist etc...), (3) failure to account for the
endogenous relation between terrorism and socio/politico-economic factors and (4) failure of identifying the
correct unit of observation at which policy decisions are made (i.e micro vs. macro, cross country vs. within
country).
Political repression, identity issues and cultural clash lie at the heart of separatist terrorism. Testas (2004)
and Abadie (2005) has shown that political freedom exerts a non-monotonic eﬀect on terrorism. In a highly
authoritarian or totalitarian regime, terrorist activities are unlikely to ﬂourish due to extreme levels of political
repression and less opportunities for revolt. Typical examples include Sudan, Yemen, Iran and Jordan in the
highly repressive pre-1991 period (Testas, 2004). At the other extreme, political terrorism would vanish in
democratic regimes because there is no incentive for conﬂict. In between these two extremes, countries that
transcend from an authoritarian regime to democracy are more likely to be exposed to increasing levels of
terrorist activity (Abadie, 2005).
In line with this view, periods of intensive terrorist activities in Turkey, as noted by some prominent
scholars and intellectuals, coincide with periods of democratization. Figure 3 displays the evolution of political
rights and PKK terrorist activity since 1978, in which a higher index value of political rights implies lower
political freedom. The sustaining escalation of PKK terrorism in Turkey started in 1987 and peaked in 1992,
in a period when political freedom reached its highest level since 1978 (an index value of 2/7). This has created
opportunities for armed rebellion. After 1992, the political climate in Turkey began to destabilize. Although
political freedom and civil rights and liberties lowered after 1992, the economic crisis in 1993-1994 period
8In another strand of literature, see Köşeli (2007), Başıbüyük (2008) and Derin-Güre and Elveren (2013) on poverty and
inequality as the roots of terrorism, Yaya (2009) and Feridun (2011) on the eﬀects of terrorism on tourism and Feridun and
Shahbaz (2010) on the relationship between defence spending and terrorism in Turkey.
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was a hard hit on Turkish economy yielding higher levels of uncertainty that lead to greater opportunities
for violence in the short-run. Despite such exceptions, there has been a stable decline in terrorist activities
between 1995 and 2002 while political freedom was stagnating at low levels (an index value of 4/7).
PKK terrorism is a manifestation of a political conﬂict. Therefore, we claim that improvements in the
macroeconomic environment alone are very unlikely, if not impossible, to reduce separatist terrorist acts. This
does not suggest that changes in the macroeconomic indicators do not aﬀect terrorism but rather implies that
the causal link from economic growth to terrorism is relatively weak. On the other hand, the (long-term)
causal impact of PKK terrorism on economic prosperity is a more relevant and realistic issue, to which we
now turn. In the following section, we seek to answer, along the lines of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003),
how the provincial GDP would have evolved in the absence of separatist terrorist activity.
3 Synthetic Control Method
The synthetic control method, developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended by Abadie et al.
(2010) and Abadie et al. (2012), has a number of advantages over the traditional panel data regression
framework. In traditional regression analysis, the choice of the comparison units is left at the discretion of
the researcher, based on the degree of similarity between the control and the aﬀected units. In the synthetic
control method, the choice of the appropriate counterfactual is selected from a pool of unaﬀected units (the
donor pool) to compare to the treated province. The appropriate comparison unit is based on observable and
quantiﬁable characteristics which reduces subjectivity and allows for better causal inference (Abadie et al.,
2010).
Unlike traditional regression analysis which relies on extrapolation outside the support of the data, the
synthetic control method constructs a linear combination of provinces unexposed to terrorism with positive
weights that sum to one. The traditional regression also, but rather in an implicit way, computes these weights
which can be positive or negative but not necessarily sum to one. This may lead to severe extrapolation
biases. In synthetic control method, the weights are assigned to provinces in the donor pool in such a way
that the pre-terrorism GDP and the covariates that are thought to inﬂuence GDP are comparable to those of
the treated province before the outbreak of terrorism9. This comparability is determined by the minimization
of root mean square prediction error (hence RMSPE) in the pre-terrorism period, which measures the lack
of ﬁt between the trajectory of the outcome varible and its synthetic counterpart (Abadie et al., 2012)10.
The synthetic control method allows the eﬀect of unobservable provincial heterogeneity to vary over time.
9For technical details, consult appendix D of this article and Abadie et al. (2010) p:494-496.
10The pre-terrorism RMSPE is
(
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(
Y1t −
∑P+1
j=2 w
∗
j Yjt
)2)1/2
and the post-terrorism RMSPE is
9
In the ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) model and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) estimator, the eﬀect of unobservable
heterogeneity is assumed to be ﬁxed over time. Hence, the synthetic control method provides an improve-
ment over FE and DiD methods and deals better with endogeneity caused by the presence of time-varying
unobservable confounders, all of which were presumed to have been accounted in the traditional regression
framework.
3.1 Prerequisites
As explained in Dhungana (2011), the accuracy of the synthetic control (i.e. the synthetic control correctly
isolates the impact of terrorism on GDP) depends on a number of prerequisites. The intervention, which is
in our case the terrorist activity, has to be signiﬁcant in the sense that the intervention has the potential
to aﬀect the economy and should sustain for a period of time. This implies that if the terrorist activity is
observed for a year or two and ceased to exist thereafter, then the synthetic control would not be able to pick
up any eﬀect of terrorism in that region.
The pre-terrorism period should be suﬃciently long so that the synthetic control method minimizes
possible biases arising due to unobservable time-variant provincial heterogeneity11. In our sample, the pre-
terrorism period ranges from 9 to 15 years depending on the year in which a particular province ﬁrst exposed
to terrorism. If the number of pre-terrorism periods is large, matching on pre-terrorism outcomes allows to
control for heterogenous responses to multiple unobserved factors. The intuition is that only provinces that
are alike in both observed and unobserved determinants as well as in the eﬀect of those determinants on
GDP should produce similar trajectories of the GDP over extended periods of time (Abadie et al., 2012).
The treated province should not have undergone a structural shock, exclusive to that region or province.
For example, if the treated province experienced a sizeable blue-collar strike or an earthquake and terrorist
activity during the same period, it is not possible to isolate the eﬀect of terrorism in the variable of interest.
On the other hand, structural breaks such as nationwide economic crises or military interventions that aﬀect
both the treated provinces and the donor pool do not invalidate the synthetic control estimates.
Terrorist activity should not have an eﬀect on provinces not exposed to terrorism (absence of geographical
spillover). If terrorism in a particular treated province had negative spillover eﬀects on the GDP of the
synthetic control provinces, then the synthetic control provinces would underestimate the counterfactual
GDP trajectory of the treated province in the absence of terrorism and the synthetic control estimates would
(
1
T1
T1∑
t=T0+1
(
Y1t −
∑P+1
j=2 w
∗
j Yjt
)2)1/2
where T0 and T1 are the pre-terrorism and post-terrorism number of periods re-
spectively, w∗j Yjt is the synthetic GDP using the j
th unexposed province with weight w∗ and Y1t is the actual GDP of the
treated province.
11The bias of the synthetic control estimator is bounded as the number of preintervention periods increases. See Abadie et al.
(2010) p:504.
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be biased downward. On the other hand, spillover eﬀects on provinces not included in the synthetic control
do not aﬀect synthetic control estimates (Abadie et al., 2012).
The intervention should not aﬀect the treated province before or after it actually takes place (absence
of temporal spillover). For example, the presence of anticipatory eﬀects is a typical concern when the
intervention is a large-scale policy change or legislation which may induce a signiﬁcant alteration in economic
behavior in response to its anticipated rather than actual eﬀects. In the presence of anticipatory eﬀects, the
intervention date may be reassigned to a period in which the outcome is known to react to the intervention
(Abadie et al., 2012). On the other extreme, the intervention may have lagged eﬀects. In this case, the eﬀects
of the intervention are observed after a certain period of time.
The method constructs a synthetic version of the treated province by using some weighted combination of
unexposed provinces (convex-hull criteria). This means that the synthetic control would not yield accurate
trajectories of the provinces with extreme values of the variable of interest and other observable characteristics.
The synthetic control method would fail to mimic the pre-terrorism real GDP of the poorest and the wealthiest
treated province in the sample because the linear weighted combination of the real GDP of the donor provinces
cannot yield a synthetic real GDP as low as the GDP of the poorest and as high as the GDP of the wealthiest
treated province.
The synthetic control estimates are based on a linear model. This suggests that the donor pool may have
to be restricted to provinces with similar observable characteristics in order to yield a good approximation.
3.2 Data and Sample
We use province-level panel data for the period 1975-2001. Our sample period begins in 1975 because it is
the earliest year for which data on real per capita GDP is available at the provincial level. Our sample period
ends in 2001 because provincial real GDP has not been made available after 2001.
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for a selected number of socio-economic and demographic in-
dicators and the intensity of PKK terrorist activity in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, where PKK
activities have been mainly concentrated, vis-a-vis the rest of Turkey. In order to facilitate the comparisons,
we report the variables in relative terms with values corresponding to each indicator normalized to 100 for
the entire country. A striking fact in these comparisons is that the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia re-
gions have systematically lower per capita GDP, productivity and low educational attainment at almost all
education levels; but also these regions are exposed to high levels of PKK terrorist activity (about 87 percent
of all terrorism casualties) compared to the rest of the country.
Currently there are 81 provinces in Turkey of which 14 of them became province between 1989 and 1999.
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However, since our sample period goes back to 1975, we aggregated these 14 new provinces into the existing
67 provinces. As shown in ﬁgure 4, of these 67 provinces, 30 were exposed to terrorist activity during this
period, of which, ten were seldom exposed to terrorism with very few casualties and very infrequent incidents
(i.e. they failed to exhibit sustained activity), therefore were shifted into the donor pool.12.
As mentioned in section 3.1, one of the prerequisites for the synthetic control method to correctly isolate
the impact of separatist terrorism on GDP is that the treated unit should not have undergone a structural
shock, exclusive to that region or province. Table 2 summarizes nationwide as well as exclusive structural
shocks during the period of 1975-2001. There were seven economic crises all of which had nationwide or
global eﬀects aﬀecting all treatment and donor provinces13. Therefore, the eﬀects of these economic crises
do not invalidate the synthetic control estimates. What may be of high concern is the presence of eight
natural disasters suﬃciently severe to strike the local economy in the sample period. Four of these disasters
aﬀected the treated provinces (Diyarbakir in 1975, Van in 1976, Erzurum in 1983 and Erzincan in 1992)
and the remaining four aﬀected provinces in the donor pool (Afyon in 1995, Adana in 1998, Kocaeli and
Bolu in 1999). Therefore we removed these four provinces from the treated units and the four provinces
from the donor pool. Additionally, we also removed Istanbul from among the treated units on the grounds
that Istanbul is the largest and wealthiest province with a high economic growth rate and its inclusion may
undermine the impact of terrorism. This yields a total of 43 provinces to be used in the donor pool and
15 potential provinces to be treated all of which are located in the Eastern or Southeastern Anatolia. As
the descriptive statistics in table 1 show, Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions have systematically
lower real per capita GDP, indicating that the synthetic control method will fail to synthetize the real GDP
trajectory of the poorest treated provinces in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (i.e failure to satisfy
the convex-hull criteria).
First, in order to satisfy the requirement of a suﬃciently long pre-terrorism period and the convex-hull
criteria, we dropped four provinces (Hakkari, Siirt, Mardin and Ağrı) from among the treated units which
were on and oﬀ exposed to terrorism in the pre-1988 period and which are fairly poorer, not only compared
to the rest of Turkey but also compared to the rest of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Second, in order to
increase the power of the synthetic control, we aggregated all the remaining 11 provinces into a single treated
12These provinces are Gümüşhane, Sivas, Hatay, Adana, Ankara, Içel, Bursa, Artvin, Çankırı and Isparta all of which are
located outside Eastern and Southeastern regions. Although PKK terrorist activities occured in other regions, they have been
mainly concentrated in the Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. We claim that due to very low and infrequent activity these
provinces are not as heavily aﬀected directly by PKK terrorism as the other eastern and southeastern provinces, implying that
their inclusion in the donor pool would have a negligible, if any, bias on our synthetic control estimates. In our view the negligible
eﬀect of direct terrorist activity in these ten provinces make them indiﬀerent with respect to the other provinces in the donor
pool that are not directly aﬀected by terrorism. Moreover, we justify our strategy by referring to Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
which use a combination of two Spanish regions (Catalonia and Madrid) to synthetize the real GDP of the Basque country in
the absence of terrorism although ETA terrorism occurred in these two control regions.
13Although these economic crises may have distinct eﬀects on diﬀerent regions based on methods of production and employment
structures, the provinces in our sample that were directly exposed to terrorism have similar production structures historically.
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unit (Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia) by calculating the weighted averages of all treated provinces for
the outcome variable and the covariates for every year in the sample period on the grounds that a temporal
spillover eﬀect may exist among the provinces aﬀected by PKK terrorism14. The ﬁrst year of terrorist activity
for the constructed Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia is 1988 which is the earliest year of ﬁrst PKK terrorist
activity reported within this region or treated unit (the latest year of ﬁrst terrorist activity for a particular
treated province in our sample is 1990). For example, one of the provinces (Bingöl) used in the aggregation
to construct the treated unit of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia was ﬁrst exposed to PKK terrorism in
1988 and another neighboring province (Muş) used in the aggregation was ﬁrst exposed to PKK terrorism in
1990. We treat the province of Muş as if it was aﬀected by PKK terrorism in 1988, although it was exposed
in 1990. Given the historical similarities of the provinces in the region and the short time period between
the earliest and the latest year of ﬁrst terrorist activity, we argue that the threat of PKK is a compelling
indication for treating all late-terror-exposed provinces as if they were aﬀected in 1988. The synthetic version
of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia is constructed from the weighted combination of provinces in the donor
pool which were not exposed to or were not aﬀected by terrorism at any year in the sample period.
The set of socioeconomic characteristics we consider to synthetize our outcome variable, the provincial
real per capita GDP of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia are the provincial real per capita GDP of the
unaﬀected control provinces for every year in the pre-terrorism period, provincial GDP growth, population
density, real wage (manufacturing industry), productivity (manufacturing industry), unemployment rate and
a selection of human capital measures for the period 1975-2001. The real per capita GDP data is available
for each year under consideration, hence used for every year in the pre-terrorism period. Yet other social and
economic indicators cannot be gathered for each year under investigation. Thus these covariates are used
when available at least for one year in the pre-terrorism period.
Our real GDP data comes from three diﬀerent sources. The earliest provincial real per capita GDP data
is collected from Özötün (1980) for the period 1975-1978; Özötün (1988) for the period 1979-1986 and the
Turkish Statistics Oﬃce (TURKSTAT) for the period 1987-200115. Data on manufacturing wages and pro-
ductivity comes from the Annual Manufacturing Survey of TURKSTAT, population density, unemployment
rate and the selected human capital indicators come from the 1985 and 1990 Annual Population Censuses
(TURKSTAT).
In the ﬁnal speciﬁcation for which we report our results, we dropped all the covariates except the real per
14This temporal spillover eﬀect should not be confused with the geographical spillover eﬀect whose absence is one of the
requirements of the synthetic control. Here, we take into account the likelihood that the outbreak of terrorism in one of the
provinces may have a spillover eﬀect in another province which was later hit by terrorism whereas the requirement of the absence
of a geographical spillover eﬀect for employing the synthetic control states that the spillover eﬀect should not infect the provinces
in the donor pool (unaﬀected units) which we assume is met.
15See appendix C for a brief explanation about the steps that are carried out to make these three datasets comparable and
consistent.
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capita GDP of the unaﬀected control provinces for every year in the pre-terrorism period and the average
real per capita GDP growth rate because neither did other covariates improve the pre-terrorism ﬁt of the
trajectory of real GDP nor yield accurate GDP trajectories when all the covariates except the real GDP
of the unaﬀected control provinces were used. This implies that the pre-terrorism actual GDP trajectory
of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia is best reproduced by some linear combination of the GDP of the
unaﬀected provinces.
3.3 Results
In the preliminary analysis, we performed the synthetic control both at the province level and by province-
aggregation based on the ﬁrst year of terrorist activity. The results, which are available upon request, either
proved to be of little signiﬁcance in properly snythetizing the actual GDP trajectory in the pre-terrorism
period although we did ﬁnd signiﬁcant causal eﬀects in the post-terrorism period for a small subset of treated
units, or failed to pass the falsiﬁcation tests16.
Figure 5 plots the trends in real GDP for Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and its synthetic counterpart
over the period 1975-2001. The synthetic real GDP trajectory is constructed by using the convex combination
of provinces in the donor pool that closely resembled Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia before the outbreak
of terrorism17. The synthetic GDP trajectory almost perfectly mimics the actual GDP trajectory in the
pre-terrorism period, which is an initial sign of success of the synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.
In the next three years following the intervention, the actual GDP rises sharply while while its synthetic
counterpart rises slightly and slowly. After this period, the synthetic GDP trajectory rises sharply above the
actual GDP trajectory of the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia over the entire sample period.
The estimate of the impact of terrorism on economic development for Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia is
given by the diﬀerence between the actual and the synthetic GDP, as shown in ﬁgure 6. In ﬁgure 6, we further
plot the intensity of terrorist activity and attempt to establish the link between separatist terrorism and the
gap between actual GDP and its synthetic counterpart. The real GDP gap in Eastern and Southeastern
Anatolia very closely tracks in the zero-gap-line in the pre-terrorism period (indicating good ﬁt) and begins
to dive approximately two years after being exposed to terrorist activity; in 1992 when the PKK terrorism
peaks. The gap between the actual GDP and its synthetic version deepens as the Eastern and Southeastern
Anatolia is exposed to an increasing intensity of terrorist activity, measured by the number of reported
casualties. This suggests that separatist terrorism imposes a sizeable and increasing eﬀect on the real GDP
over time. Our ﬁndings suggest that in the post-terrorism period, the real GDP declined on average by 6.6
16See Section 3.4 on the falsiﬁcation tests.
17We use the synth command in STATA, which can be found at http://www.mit.edu/~jhainm/synthpage.html
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percent relative to a synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia without terrorism18.
3.4 Inference about the Impact of Terrorism
In order to ensure that a particular synthetic control estimate reﬂects the impact of terrorism (i.e. the
synthetic controls provide good predictors of the trajectory of per capita GDP in pre-terrorism periods),
we perform a series of falsiﬁcation tests known as in-space placebo test, in which we artiﬁcially reassign the
terrorism period to each of the 43 provinces not directly exposed to terrorism and shift the treated unit
into the donor pool. If the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia was heavily exposed to terrorism and other
provinces were not, our expectation is that the unexposed units that are subject to the synthetic control
method should not be aﬀected by terrorism, thus should not yield a diverging actual and synthetic GDP akin
to that of the treated unit. Therefore, our conﬁdence that a sizeable synthetic control estimate reﬂects the
eﬀect of terrorism would be severely undermined if similar or larger estimated GDP gaps are obtained when
terrorism is artiﬁcially assigned to provinces not directly exposed to terrorism (Abadie et al., 2010)19.
Figure 7 reports the results of the placebo experiments. The black line represents the estimated GDP gap
of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and the gray lines represent the estimated GDP gap for provinces not
directly exposed to terrorism. In order to infer that separatist terrorism imposes a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
on real GDP, the estimated GDP gap (actual−synthetic) of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia should be
very close to zero in the pre-terrorism period (i.e. should yield a good ﬁt) but should also stand out in the
post-terrorism period (i.e. the gap should be as negative as possible) relative to the estimated gaps for the
provinces in the donor pool. Otherwise, we would either infer that the post-terrorism GDP gap is artiﬁcially
created by a lack of ﬁt (Abadie et al., 2010), or separatist terrorism does not have any sizeable impact on
real GDP of the treated unit. The former may happen when the pre-terrorism ﬁt is poor and the latter may
happen when the synthetic GDP closely tracks the actual over the entire sample period. Along the placebo
experiments ran for all the provinces in the donor pool, we additionally report two sets of the placebo results
for a restricted number of placebo runs based on a mean square prediction error (MSPE) cut-oﬀ level. The
upper panel in ﬁgure 7 displays the estimated real GDP gap for Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and the
placebo gaps for the remaining 43 provinces in the donor pool. The synthetic real GDP yields an excellent
ﬁt in the pre-terrorism period. The middle panel in ﬁgure 7 discards all the provinces with a MSPE ten
times higher than the treated unit’s. At this cutoﬀ level, 12 provinces are discarded from the donor pool.
18This causal eﬀect is calculated by taking the ratio of the diﬀerence between the average real GDP of the synthetic and
the average real GDP of the actual Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia to the average real GDP of the synthetic Eastern and
Southeastern Anatolia in the post-terrorism period.
19A second array of falsiﬁcation tests is known as in-time placebo tests, in which the outbreak of terrorism is artiﬁcially
reassigned to dates earlier than the actual date. We did not perform in-time placebos because our sample period is not
suﬃciently long to assign an artiﬁcial date of intervention for Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.
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the lower panel in ﬁgure 7 discards all the provinces with a MSPE ﬁve times higher than the treated unit’s.
At this cutoﬀ level, a total of 26 provinces are discarded20. In the post-terrorism period, the estimated gap
widens (in absolute value) and clearly stands out. Although the post-terrorism real GDP gap for Eastern
and Southeastern Anatolia is not one of the largest among all the placebo gaps, indicating that the impact
of PKK terrorism is not huge, this post-terrorism real GDP gap, as shown below, is a causal rather than a
random eﬀect.
In order to assess this, we apply the synthetic control method to estimate in-space placebo GDP gaps for
every potential control province in order to create a distribution of placebo eﬀects. This distribution enables
us to identify the exact signiﬁcance level of the estimated eﬀect of separatist terrorism. Our conﬁdence
that a sizeable synthetic control estimate reﬂects the eﬀect of terrorism would be severely undermined if the
estimated gap fell well inside the distribution of placebo gaps (Abadie et al., 2012). This would imply that
our results were driven by randomness rather than causality. In other words, a signiﬁcant causal eﬀect of
separatist terrorism on the treated unit requires that the estimated eﬀect should be unusually large relative
to the distribution of placebo eﬀects. The estimated eﬀect of terrorism for the treated unit is evaluated by
calculating the ratio of post-terrorism RMSPE to pre-terrorism RMSPE that are equal to or greater than the
one for the treated unit. This ratio is the p-value that can be interpreted as the probability of obtaining a
post/pre-terrorism RMSPE that is at least as large as the one obtained for Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia
when terrorism is artiﬁcially and randomly reassigned to an unexposed province (Abadie et al., 2012).
Figure 8 plots the distribution of placebo eﬀects for Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and for every
43 province in the donor pool. The estimated GDP gap fell well outside the distribution of placebo gaps.
This means that, if a province would have been randomly selected from the sample, the probability of
obtaining a post/pre-terrorism RMSPE ratio as high as that of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia would
be 1/44 = 0.0227. No control province in the sample achieves such a high ratio. This p-value is below the
5-percent conventional test level used to reject the null hypothesis for testing the signiﬁcance of a parameter
estimate in the traditional regression analysis.
3.5 Robustness Test
In this section, we perform a robustness check to test the sensitivity of our results to the changes in the
synthetic control province weights induced by the exclusion of any particular province from the sample.
From table 4, the synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia is constructed by the weighted average of
nine provinces, namely Ankara, Artvin, Çankırı, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Muğla, Sivas, Tokat and Uşak. We
20When the cut-oﬀ MSPE level is two times higher than the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia’s, all 43 control provinces are
discarded (not reported).
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iteratively re-estimate our model to construct a synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia omitting in
each iteration one of the provinces that was assigned a weight in table 4. Our aim is the assess the extent
to which our results are driven by any particular province. Figure 9 displays the results in which the black
solid line is the actual real GDP, the black dashed line is the synthetic real GDP of Eastern and Southeastern
Anatolia with all nine weight-assigned provinces and the gray lines are the leave-one-out estimates. The
leave-one-out distribution of the synthetic control shows that our main result reported in Figure 5 is fairly
robust to the exclusion of any particular province. The average of all nine leave-one-out estimates of the
synthetic control (gray lines) are on average 0.04 percent higher than the actual real GDP of Eastern and
Southeastern Anatolia (black solid line) in the pre-terrorism period and 0.04 percent lower than the original
synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (black dashed line) in the pre-terrorism period. In the post-
terrorism period, the average of all nine leave-one-out estimates of the synthetic control are on average 0.01
percent higher than the original synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.
4 Discussion
There exists a systematic relation between the breadth of PKK terrorism, ethnicity, poverty and geography.
Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey where PKK terrorism reigns are distinguishably mountainous,
Kurdish-populated and less prosperous than the rest of the country. In the shadow of a persistent gap between
the Western and Eastern regions of Turkey, this relation compels us to discuss the policy implications of our
analysis within the scope of convergence and regional inequality debate. While we ﬁnd a sizeable, signiﬁcant
and increasing eﬀect of terrorism on economic growth in these regions, it would be misleading to state that
income inequality and underdevelopment would not have existed if PKK terrorism had never emerged. The
comparison of the 1975 and 2001 per capita income dispersion in Turkey suggests that the regional income
gap between western and eastern Turkey around the 2000s has its roots in the pre-terrorism period of the
mid 1970s. Given the persistence of the income gaps, the roots of these inequalities should be attributed to
diﬀerent regional fundamentals as well as to historical developments of these regions. Separatist terrorism
plays a crucial role in understanding the rigidity of the spatial heterogenous income pattern in Turkey with
almost no sign of regional convergence. This suggest that terror-stricken provinces may not fully catch up
but only approximate the “average” province with a 7 percent higher real GDP that would have been enjoyed
in the absence of terrorism. An income gap of this size is substantial considering the low GDP levels in
the Eastern and Southeastern provinces relative to the rest of Turkey and enough to expect a reduction in
regional inequalities had a local or macro-level policy initiative implemented with the aim of depressing the
level of PKK terrorist activity.
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There are other, prominently leftist or Islamist groups that have carried out terrorist activities throughout
our sample period and that are of non-separatist nature21. A particular concern is that the causal eﬀect of
PKK terrorism on economic prosperity would be contaminated and our synthetic control estimates would be
unable to isolate the causal eﬀect of PKK if leftist or Islamist terrorist activities took place in the treated
unit or in the weight-assigned provinces in the donor pool to the extent that these activities are signiﬁcant
and sustained for a period of time. A close inspection of the GTD data on leftist and Islamist terrorist groups
in Turkey reveals that both types of terrorism in Turkey are signiﬁcantly weak, unsustained and prevailed
in major cities like Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara although there are solitary cases in other provinces. While
Istanbul is discarded from the analysis and Izmir is not a weight-assigned province in the donor pool, there
were a total of 49 casualties (fatalities+injured) associated with leftist terrorism and 14 casualties associated
with Islamist terrorism in the capital city Ankara during the period 1975-2001. Absence of signiﬁcant terrorist
activity by these groups suggests that they are unlikely to confound the causal eﬀect of PKK. Even if these
types of terrorism were supposed to have had any impact on the economic environment, our ﬁndings would
still be admissible because the robustness check reported in section 3.5 and in ﬁgure 9 reveal that the omission
of Ankara from the synthetic control leaves our results virtually unchanged. Therefore we argue that the
presence of leftist or Islamist terrorist groups in Turkey does not invalidate our synthetic control estimates.
The endogeneity central to our research question is a fact for Turkey. The spatial dispersion of per capita
GDP already give us hints about the validity of this issue. Provinces that have been exposed to terrorist
activity are predominantly the ones with the lowest per capita income in 1975. Inevitably, this should raise
concerns about the local links that feed the evolution of terrorism that prevails mostly in these locations.
This, however, does not diminish the impeding role that is attributed to separatist terrorism for further
development and growth struggles of these locations. Moreover the synthetic control method we employ
in this paper does not suﬀer from endogeneity bias caused by the omission of time-variant unobservable
provincial heterogeneity that has been observed in other studies on PKK terrorism. Even though there
is not a single province in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia that was not aﬀected by terrorism and
that terror-stricken areas are typically poorer that the rest of Turkey, our methodology made it possible to
successfully synthetize the real GDP of terror-stricken regions by using the convex combinations of unaﬀected
provinces that are all located outside the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.
One important fact that has to be considered for the Eastern and Southeastern Turkey is the underdevel-
opment phenomenon. Given the endogeneity issues, this underdevelopment may be of concern once the direct
and indirect interventions of the central government towards these underdeveloped areas are considered. One
21The major leftist terrorist groups are Dev-Sol, Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), Marxist-Leninist
Armed Propaganda Unit, Turkish People’s Liberation Army and Turkish People’s Liberation Front (THKP-C). Notable Islamist
terrorist organizations are the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C) and Hezbollah.
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important intervention is the Priority Development Area (PDA) Program. The PDA is one of the most
remarkable policy implementations of Turkey against regional inequalities and underdevelopment. The ﬁrst
program was taken into the policy-making agenda in 1968 with 22 provinces. The PDA is implemented not
only in all terror-stricken provinces in Turkey but also in provinces which were not aﬀected by or exposed to
PKK terrorism (donor pool). In fact, the latest ﬁgures for 2003 indicate that the number of provinces subject
to PDA project is 50 and well beyond the number of terror-exposed units in our sample22. Therefore, the
presence of the PDA program does not invalidate our synthetic control estimates as it aﬀects both Eastern
and Southeastern Anatolia as well as the units in the donor pool in our sample period.
Our estimates should be considered minimum for at least two reasons. First, the regional unequal dis-
tribution of prosperity in Turkey is a concern in the ﬁve-year development plans of the state during the
post-1960 era. Although there are a number of policy recommendations, mostly through the allocation of
public investments and subsidies, in general, their implementation is far from being successful. The speciﬁc
policy of PDA mentioned above aims to support the least developed regions but cannot reach the targets.
Similarly, the public investment directed towards these less developed regions of Turkey are unable to alter
the local economic environment. Second, the presence of PKK and the threat of terrorism cause a larger
share to be devoted to military expenditures, albeit higher levels of military expenditures are not entirely
caused by PKK terrorism. The overall increase in the state budget due to an increased share of military
expenditure can only be oﬀset by shifting resources away from productive sectors such as health or education
and towards the defence industry. By a mere conjecture, not only the share of the military budget would be
lower but also the resource allocation would be eﬃcient in the absence of terrorism. These factors suggest
that the size of our estimate represents the lower bound of the causal eﬀect of PKK terrorism on economic
growth.
Finally, a natural experiment akin to that of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), could be conducted for
the period 2000-2004 during which PKK declared its longest unilateral cease-ﬁre. This would have enabled
us to investigate whether an extended and credible cease-ﬁre period is reﬂected in a recovering economic
performance of Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. Unfortunately, provincial per capita GDP has not been
made available for the post-2001 period and therefore we were unable to test this prediction.
22See Ministry of Development for the spatial and historical dispersion of the provinces that are subject to the PDA Program
(http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGosterim.aspx?Enc=83D5A6FF03C7B4FC0B6C445B8568FF66
accessed on 21 July 2013 )
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5 Conclusion
We use province-level panel data for the period 1975-2001 in order to reveal the causal impact of separatist
terrorism on real GDP in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia in Turkey. We employ the synthetic control
method which is based on estimating the counterfactual: how the provincial GDP would have evolved in the
absence of terrorism. Extended over a period of 14 years (from 1988 to 2001), we ﬁnd an average gap of
about 7 percent between the actual real GDP of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and the real GDP of a
comparable synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia without terrorism. This estimated gap is attributed
to PKK terrorism and increases over time.
Province aggregation helps dealing with a number of challenges we face in this study. First, province
aggregation not only increases the power of the synthetic control but also becomes useful when the synthetic
version of the individual treated unit cannot be properly produced from the convex combination of control
units due to the failure to fulﬁl the convex-hull requirements. Second, province aggregation deals with
potential geographical spillover eﬀects of terrorism among the provinces aﬀected by terrorism. By aggregating
the provinces in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, we were able to construct a synthetic version of the
region’s GDP with a very good ﬁt in the pre-terrorism period and a higher GDP in the post-terrorism period
in the absence of PKK terrorism. Permutation tests (placebo experiments) indicated that the impact of
PKK terrorism on the region’s economy is a causal rather than a random eﬀect with no compelling evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. Further, robustness tests show that our result is fairly robust to the exclusion of
any particular province.
The PKK terrorism has been at the center of the political debate for almost four decades. The odds for
a permanent resolution is plagued by friction and disunity and thus appears to be low in the near future.
PKK terrorism not only impedes the nation’s democratization and modernization eﬀorts but also reduces the
country’s ability to ﬂourish economically. We hope that our research, at least from the point where economic
prosperity matters, will help hasten the peace process.
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A Figures
Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of per capita real GDP in Turkey, 1975-2001
Source: TURKSTAT, Özötün (1980), Özötün (1988).
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Figure 3: Political Freedom and Terrorism, 1978-2011
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World index, http://www.freedomhouse.org
Note: The political rights index ranges from 1 (highest political freedom) to 7 (lowest
political freedom).
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Figure 4: Spatial Distribution of PKK Terrorist Activity in Turkey, all casualties, 1984-2001
Source: Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. PKK attacks and armed
conﬂicts chronology: http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKK_saldırıları_ve_çatışmaları_kronolojisi
Note: Figures may underestimate the total volume of activity due to inexact location of a
number of reported armed conﬂicts.
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Figure 5: Trends in real GDP: Treated vs. Synthetic Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Notes: The Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia excludes Hakkari, Siirt, Mardin, Ağrı.
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Figure 6: Estimated Real GDP Gap and Terrorist Activity, 1975-2001
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Figure 7: Real GDP gaps in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and Placebo Gaps in Control Provinces
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Figure 8: In-space Placebo Distributions, Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Figure 9: Leave-one-out Distribution of the Synthetic Control
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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B Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 1975-2001 (Turkey = 100)
Eastern Southeastern Rest of
Anatolia Anatolia Turkey
Demography & Geography
Total population 9.7 9.0 81.3
Population density 46.7 123.5 113.0
Surface 20.8 7.3 71.9
Economic indicators
Per capita real GDP 42.7 56.1 111.7
Real wages 108.1 67.1 100.5
Productivity 56.7 57.6 102.1
Human Capital
No education 109.3 93.3 99.6
Primary education 77.6 55.4 107.6
Secondary education 77.7 55.0 107.6
Higher education 75.2 51.0 108.4
University education 54.2 42.0 111.9
PKK terrorist activity
Total Deaths 42.8 48.6 8.6
Total Injured 32.2 43.2 24.6
Total casualties 39.6 47.0 13.4
Source: TURKSTAT, Özötün (1980), Özötün (1988).
Notes: Total population, per capita GDP and population density ﬁgures are
averaged over the 1975-2001 period. Real wages and productivity ﬁgures
are averaged over the 1980-1997 period. Human capital measures are from
the 1985 population census. Deaths, injured and casualties are the sums over
the sample period.
34
Table 2: Structural Economic, Political and Other Shocks in Turkey, 1975-2001
Date Event Impact area Impact
2 September 1975 Earthquake Lice, Diyarbakır Dead: 2370, Injured: 4500, Damage: Severea
24 November 1976 Earthquake Çaldıran, Van Dead: 3900, Injured: 497, Damage: Severea
1978-1979 Economic crisis Nationwide Turkish lira (TL) devalued by 30 percent in 1978 and
77 percent in 1979c,d.
1979-1980 Oil crisis Global OPEC raised the petroleum price by 150 percent.
Unemployment rate: 20 percent, Inﬂation rate: 69
percent,TL devalued by 49 percentc,d.
12 September 1980 Military coup Nationwide 650,000 people were taken into custody, 230,000
were tried, 7000 people sentenced to death, 517
death sentences were executed. All political parties
were abolishedb.
30 October 1983 Earthquake Horasan, Erzurum Dead: 1400, Injured: 537, Damage: Severea
1989 Financial Nationwide Higher economic volatility, dependent determination
Liberalization of exchange and interest ratese.
13 March 1992 Earthquake Erzincan Dead: 652, Injured: 2000, Damage: Considerablea
Late 1993-1994 Economic crisis Nationwide 500,000 people were laid-oﬀ, net capital outﬂow: $4.2
billion, interest rate on treasury bonds: 400 percent,
CPI: 106 percent, short-term debt: $18.5 billionc,d.
1 October 1995 Earthquake Dinar, Afyon Dead: 101, Injured: 348, Damage: Moderatea
27 June 1998 Earthquake Ceyhan, Adana Dead: 145, Injured: 1500, Damage: Considerablea
1999 Economic Crisis Nationwide $6 billion hot money outﬂow, GDP fell by 6.4 percent,
real interest rate: 37 percent, foreign debt: $103 billionc,d.
17 August 1999 Earthquake Gölcük, Kocaeli Dead: 17118 , Injured: 50000, Damage: Extremea
12 November 1999 Earthquake Düzce Dead: 894, Injured: 4948 , Damage: Severea
22 November 2000 Economic Crisis Nationwide Overnight interest rate skyrocketed, foreign debt: $114
billion, short-term debt: $29 billionc,d.
Sources: aUtsu Catalog, International Institute of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering, http://iisee.kenken.go.jp
bCumhuriyet Gazetesi, “Darbenin Bilançosu”, 12 September 2000 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr
cSabah Gazetesi, “Türkiye’de Ekonomik Krizler”, 19 April 2011 http://www.sabah.com.tr/
dAkpınar, A.T. (2009) “Türkiye’de Meydana Gelen 15 Ekonomik Krizin Kısa Analizi”, http://sinestezi.wordpress.com
eYeldan, E. (2001), Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye Ekonomisi: Bölüşüm, Birikim ve Büyüme, Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları
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Table 3: Pre-terrorism Predictor Balance
Eastern & South- Synthetic Eastern &
eastern Anatolia Southeastern Anatolia
Real GDP (1975) 625.42 613.60
Real GDP (1976) 668.39 676.71
Real GDP (1977) 664.88 665.79
Real GDP (1978) 620.03 619.82
Real GDP (1979) 540.69 547.41
Real GDP (1980) 506.18 504.50
Real GDP (1981) 567.02 566.78
Real GDP (1982) 549.50 552.49
Real GDP (1983) 547.08 550.00
Real GDP (1984) 572.37 576.19
Real GDP (1985) 656.84 654.46
Real GDP (1986) 716.41 715.94
Real GDP (1987) 771.78 769.35
Real GDP growth rate 2.09 1.85
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Table 4: Synthetic Control Weights, Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia
Province Weight Province Weight Province Weight
Ankara 0.021 Giresun 0.227 Sivas 0.055
Artvin 0.035 Gümüşhane 0.404 Tokat 0.167
Çankırı 0.004 Muğla 0.086 Uşak 0.001
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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C Concatenation of GDP Data
One of the most striking issues about the provincial GDP is the inconsistency of the three data sets (1975-
1978, 1979-1986 and 1987-2001) used to construct the provincial GDP series for the period 1975-2001. While
a speciﬁc transformation is oﬀered by Karaca (2004), we performed a number of similar procedures to cope
with this inconsistency which is summarized below.
The 1975-1978 and 1979-1986 data sets are constructed by Özötün (1980) and Özötün (1988). First, these
two data sets are concatenated in current prices. However in its original form, they will not be consistent
with the 1987-2001 data because the TURKSTAT data is constructed by the new revised GDP calculations
in Turkey. To deal with this inconsistency, we ﬁrst calculated the percentage share of provincial total GDP
in current prices for each of the 67 provinces for the period 1975-1986. Then the revised total GDP measures
at the country level for the 1975-1986 period is multiplied by the calculated provincial GDP shares to reach
the new revised provincial total GDP ﬁgures for the 1975-1986 period. Following these transformations,
the provincial total GDP for the 1975-1986 period is deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator (1987=100) to obtain
the provincial real total GDP. The per capita real GDP values for the 1975-1986 period are calculated by
dividing the provincial real total GDP by the provincial population to obtain the provincial real GDP per
capita. This transformed GDP series is then concatenated with the 1987-2001 provincial real GDP (at 1987
constant prices) to obtain a consistent and comparable provincial real GDP per capita from 1975 to 2001.
The transformed GDP ﬁgures used in this study are consistent with the provincial GDP ﬁgures supplied
by Karaca (2004). Furthermore, in comparison to our transformed GDP data set, the data set given by
Karaca (2004) does not yield signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of constructing the synthetic GDP trajectories.
Both the transformed GDP ﬁgures and the synthetic control estimates using Karaca (2004) data set are
available from the authors upon request.
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D Technical Details
The synthetic control method is developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and expanded by Abadie et al.
(2010) and Abadie et al. (2012). In this section, we overview the technical details of the methodology and
discuss its advantages over the traditional regression framework.
Suppose there are P + 1 provinces in the sample, indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , P + 1 over T periods, t =
1, 2, . . . , T . Only province i = 1 is exposed to terrorism and the remaining P provinces are the potential
control provinces unaﬀected by terrorist activity, called the donor pool. There are T0 number of pre-terrorism
periods and T1 number of post-terrorism periods so that T0 + T1 = T . The eﬀect of terrorism for unit i at
time t is given by αit = Y Iit − Y Nit where Y Iit is the real per capita GDP of unit i if exposed to terrorism in
T0 + 1 to T and Y Nit is the real per capita GDP in the absence of terrorism. Since only unit i = 1 is exposed
to terrorism, we need to estimate (α1T0+1, . . . , α1T ). We ﬁrst estimate Y Nit by the following factor model:
Y Nit = δt + θtZi + λtμi + εit (1)
where δt is an unknown common factor invariant across units, Zi is the covariate vector not aﬀected by
terrorist activity, θt is a vector of unknown time-speciﬁc parameters, λt is a vector of unknown common
factors, μi is the province-speciﬁc unobservable and the error term εit are the zero-mean transitory shocks.
The presence of anticipatory eﬀects are irrelevant in our case, implying that all the elements in Zi that belong
to pre-terrorism period are unaﬀected by terrorism.
Equation (1) allows the eﬀect of unobservable provincial heterogeneity to vary over time. In the ﬁxed
eﬀects (FE) model and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) estimator, the eﬀect of unobservable heterogeneity,
λt, is assumed to be ﬁxed over time. Hence, the synthetic control method provides an improvement over FE
and DiD methods and deals better with endogeneity caused by the presence of time-varying unobservable
confounders, all of which were presumed to have been accounted in the traditional regression framework.
The method aims to construct the missing counterfactual, Y Nit , from provinces not aﬀected by terrorism.
Let W = (w2, . . . , wP+1)
′
be (P × 1) vector of weights such that 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 for j = 2, 3, . . . , P + 1 and
∑P+1
j=2 wj = 1. Deﬁne the linear combination of pre-terrorism values of real GDP as Y¯
k
j =
∑T0
m=1 kmYjm.
Abadie et al. (2010) show that if the following conditions hold, then the estimate of the eﬀect of terrorism
for the aﬀected/exposed unit, αˆ1t = Y1t −
∑P+1
j=2 w
∗
jYjt, is an unbiased estimator of α1t:
∑P+1
j=2 w
∗
jZj = Z1 ∧
∑P+1
j=2 w
∗
j Y¯
k
j = Y¯
k
1
(2)
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where w∗j is the weight assigned to the jth unexposed province.
Equation (2) can hold exactly only if
(
Y¯ k1 , Z1
)
belongs to the convex hull of
[(
Y¯ k2 , Z2
)
, . . . ,
(
Y¯ kP+1, ZP+1
)]
.
This means that the pre-terrorism real per capita GDP of some of the exposed provinces may not be syn-
thetized accurately using the pre-terrorism characteristics of the unexposed provinces.
The vector W ∗ is chosen to minimize the distance between the vector of pre-terrorism characteristics
for the exposed province (X1) and the weighted matrix that contains the pre-terrorism characteristics of
unexposed provinces (X0): ‖ X1 − X0W ‖=
√
(X1 −X0W )′ V (X1 −X0W ) where V is a symmetric and
positive semideﬁnite matrix. This minimization procedure is subject to the constraints that the weight
assigned to each unexposed province should lie between zero and one and that the sum of the weights is
bounded by one.
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